The exam will be open book / open notes / open screenshot (but no laptops or other electronic/communicating devices). Section numbers refer to the lecture notes.

You should be able to...

• ...explain how to use frequency analysis to break the Vigenere cipher and a substitution cipher. **Section 1**
• ...to apply frequency analysis to break the Vigenere and the substitution cipher. (In simple cases where no big computations are needed.)
• ...distinguish between ciphertext-only attacks, known-plaintext attacks, chosen-plaintext attacks, and chosen-ciphertext attacks. **Section 2**
• ...determine whether an encryption scheme has perfect secrecy. **Section 3**
• ...explain the drawbacks of the one-time pad (both in terms of practicality and security).
• ...construct an attack on a scheme that uses the one-time pad incorrectly.
• ...list what disadvantages are unavoidable in schemes with perfect secrecy.
• ...for any part of the definition of perfect secrecy, explain why this part of the definition is as it is.
• ...describe the components of a stream cipher. **Section 4**
• ...explain which properties a key stream should have and why.
• ...describe how an LFSR is constructed and how it can be used to build a streamcipher (an insecure one, though).
• ...from a fragment of the keystream produced by an LFSR derive the initial state (key) of the LFSR.
• ...describe the advantages and disadvantages of “best-effort design” and provable security.
• ...give examples of both.
• ...explain the different parts of the definition of IND-OT-CPA, i.e., why the definition is the way it is.

• ...given a variant of the definition in which one of the parts are changed, give an example why this leads to undesirable consequences. (E.g., by describing a scheme that satisfies the definition while having drawbacks that are excluded by the original definition.)

• ...explain the different parts of the definition of PRG, i.e., why the definition is the way it is.

• ...given a variant of the definition in which one of the parts are changed, give an example why this leads to undesirable consequences. (E.g., by describing a scheme that satisfies the definition while having drawbacks that are excluded by the original definition.)

• ...describe how to build a streamcipher from a PRG and sketch the reason for its security.

• ...explain why a streamcipher constructed from a PRG is not IND-CPA secure.

• ...given an encryption scheme that is not IND-OT-CPA secure, explain why it is not IND-OT-CPA by giving an attack.

• ...describe what a block cipher is.

• ...describe what a Feistel network is.

• ...explain how to decrypt a ciphertext encrypted with a Feistel network.

• ...given the description of a block cipher similar in structure to AES, identify the objectives behind different parts of the block cipher (e.g., why is the key XORed in at a given place, why do we have a key schedule, why are certain bits permuted, why are S-boxes applied, why is the construction repeated, etc.)

• ...explain the different parts of the definition of strong PRP, i.e., why the definition is the way it is.

• ...given a variant of the definition in which one of the parts are changed, give an example why this leads to undesirable consequences. (E.g., by describing a scheme that satisfies the definition while having drawbacks that are excluded by the original definition.)

• ...given an encryption scheme that is not a strong PRP, explain why it is not a strong PRP (e.g., by giving an attack).

• ...explain the different parts of the definition of IND-CPA (symmetric case), i.e., why the definition is the way it is.
• . . . given a variant of the definition in which one of the parts are changed, give an example why this leads to undesirable consequences. (E.g., by describing a scheme that satisfies the definition while having drawbacks that are excluded by the original definition.)

• . . . given an encryption scheme that is not IND-CPA, explain why it is not IND-CPA (e.g., by giving an attack).

• . . . motivate why IND-CPA encryption (i.e., security against chosen-plaintext attacks) is necessary. (I.e., why do we have to assume that the adversary can provide plaintexts of his choosing to be encrypted. – Example setting?)

• . . . describe the relation between the different security definitions of encryption schemes (IND-OT-CPA, IND-CPA, strong PRP). Which implies which? Which does not imply the which (separating example)?

• . . . determine in which situation which definition is needed and why (e.g., given the description of a use-case, tell which definition is necessary and why).

• . . . describe ECB mode (either in formulas, or pictorially in the special case of a message consisting of a few blocks).

• . . . explain the security drawbacks of ECB mode.

• . . . describe CBC mode (either in formulas, or pictorially in the special case of a message consisting of a few blocks).

• . . . explain why it is important that the IV is random in CBC mode. (Give attack for fixed IV against IND-CPA security.)

• . . . tell which of ECB and CBC mode satisfy which security property.

• . . . show that none of these is IND-CCA secure by giving an attack.

• . . . describe what is the difference between symmetric and public-key cryptography, and what are the advantages of public-key cryptography.

• . . . describe text-book RSA.

• . . . show that decryption returns the correct message in text-book RSA.

• . . . explain the relation between text-book RSA and the RSA assumption (in particular: if the RSA assumption holds, what do we know about the security of text-book RSA?)

• . . . describe the ElGamal encryption scheme.

• . . . show that decryption returns the correct message in ElGamal.
• ...explain the different parts of the definition of IND-CPA (public key case), i.e., why the definition is the way it is.

• ...given a variant of the definition in which one of the parts are changed, give an example why this leads to undesirable consequences. (E.g., by describing a scheme that satisfies the definition while having drawbacks that are excluded by the original definition.)

• ...given an encryption scheme that is not IND-CPA, explain why it is not IND-CPA (e.g., by giving an attack).

• ...explain the different parts of the definition of DDH assumption, i.e., why the definition is the way it is.

• ...explain why ElGamal is secure under the DDH assumption (i.e., explain why \( m \cdot h^y \mod p \) hides \( m \) if the DDH assumption holds).

• ...explain what malleability means.

• ...given a malleable encryption scheme (ElGamal or text-book RSA), and a specific setting in which malleability poses a problem, describe an attack that makes use of the malleability. (Similar to the auction example and the chosen ciphertext attack example in Section 7.3.)

• ...explain the different parts of the definition of IND-CCA (public key case), i.e., why the definition is the way it is.

• ...given a variant of the definition in which one of the parts are changed, give an example why this leads to undesirable consequences. (E.g., by describing a scheme that satisfies the definition while having drawbacks that are excluded by the original definition.)

• ...given an encryption scheme that is not IND-CCA, explain why it is not IND-CCA (e.g., by giving an attack).

• ...explain why IND-CCA security implies that a scheme is not malleable.

• ...explain how hybrid encryption works.

• ...argue (without formal proof) why hybrid encryption is secure.

• ...say under which conditions a hybrid encryption scheme is IND-CPA/IND-CCA secure.

• ...describe collision-resistance. Section 8

• ...give examples what collision-resistance is good for.

• ...explain the different parts of the definition of collision-resistance, i.e., why the definition is the way it is.
• ...given a variant of the definition in which one of the parts are changed, give an example why this leads to undesirable consequences. (E.g., by describing a scheme that satisfies the definition while having drawbacks that are excluded by the original definition.)

• ...given a hash function that is not collision-resistant, explain why it is not collision-resistant (e.g., by giving an attack).

• ...explain what a compression function is.

• ...explain how to construct a hash function from a compression function using the Iterated Hash construction.

• ...say under which conditions Iterated Hash is collision-resistant and which are its limitations (in terms of security).

• ...construct a collision for Iterated Hash (given $x^*$ with $F(iv\|x^*) = iv$), potentially under certain additional requirements on the messages that should collide (as long as this does not lead to an attack substantially different from the one in the lecture notes).

• ...explain why the Merkle-Damgård removes the restrictions of Iterated Hash (in terms of security).

• ...for simple variations in the padding of Merkle-Damgård, explain why they are not collision-resistant.

• ...describe the birthday attack, its approximate running time and memory consumption.

• ...explain what a MAC is and what it is for. \[Section 9\]

• ...explain the different parts of the definition of EF-CMA (MAC case), i.e., why the definition is the way it is.

• ...given a variant of the definition in which one of the parts are changed, give an example why this leads to undesirable consequences. (E.g., by describing a scheme that satisfies the definition while having drawbacks that are excluded by the original definition.)

• ...given a MAC that is not EF-CMA, explain why it is not EF-CMA (e.g., by giving an attack).

• ...explain why the naive construction $MAC(k, m) := H(k \| m)$ is insecure (assuming that $H$ is Merkle-Damgård constructed) by giving an attack.

• ...explain why this (or a similar) attack does not work on the HMAC scheme.

• ...list under which conditions HMAC is EF-CMA secure.
• . . . explain under which conditions CBC-MAC is secure.
• . . . show that CBC-MAC is not secure by describing an attack.
• . . . explain why that attack does not work on DMAC.
• . . . tell what properties are needed from a hash function to use it to extend the message space of a MAC without losing EF-CMA security.
• . . . sketch why EF-CMA security is not lost when using a suitable hash function for extending the message space
• . . . describe the relation between PRFs and MACs. Which implies which? Which does not imply the which (separating example)?
• . . . explain the different parts of the definition of one-way functions, i.e., Section 11 why the definition is the way it is.
• . . . given a variant of the definition in which one of the parts are changed, give an example why this leads to undesirable consequences. (E.g., by describing a function that satisfies the definition while having drawbacks that are excluded by the original definition.)
• . . . given a function that is not one-way, explain why it is not one-way (e.g., by giving an attack).
• . . . explain why, if the encryption function of an encryption scheme is one-way, this does not make it a good encryption scheme (in terms of security).
• . . . list which of the different cryptographic primitives discussed in the lecture (like PRGs, IND-CCA symmetric encryption, IND-CPA public key encryption, etc.) can be constructed from OWFs and which cannot.
• . . . explain the random-oracle model / the random-oracle heuristic. Section 12
• . . . given a protocol that is secure in the random-oracle model, and given a sketch of the main argument of the security proof, decide (and justify) whether this is a case where the random-oracle heuristic may or should not be applied (in view of its unsoundness).
• . . . explain what a signature is and what it is for. Section 13
• . . . explain the different parts of the definition of EF-CMA (signature case), i.e., why the definition is the way it is.
• . . . given a variant of the definition in which one of the parts are changed, give an example why this leads to undesirable consequences. (E.g., by describing a scheme that satisfies the definition while having drawbacks that are excluded by the original definition.)
• . . . given a signature scheme that is not EF-CMA, explain why it is not EF-CMA (e.g., by giving an attack).
• ... tell what properties are needed from a hash function to use it to extend the message space of a signature scheme without losing EF-CMA security.

• ... sketch why EF-CMA security is not lost when using a suitable hash function for extending the message space.

• ... explain how to use text-book RSA as a signature scheme.

• ... show that text-book RSA (as a signature scheme) is not EF-CMA secure by giving an attack.

• ... explain the difference between signatures and one-time signatures.

• ... describe how to construct one-time signatures from one-way functions (Lamport’s scheme).

• ... sketch why that construction is EF-OT-CMA secure.

• ... sketch the construction of tree-based signatures (no need to cover: usage of PRFs to fix the randommess).

• ... describe the RSA-FDH scheme.

• ... explain why the attack that breaks the EF-CMA security of text-book RSA signatures does not break the security of RSA-FDH.

• ... list under what conditions RSA-FDH is EF-CMA secure (don’t overlook the random oracle).

• ... discuss what we know about the security of RSA-FDH if we use a real-life hash function $H$ instead of a random oracle.

• ... discuss advantages/disadvantages of symbolic cryptography.

• ... given a simple protocol, write down the adversary deduction rules.

• ... given a set of deduction rules, write down the grammar of all messages that can be derived using these rules.

• ... given a grammar of all messages that can be derived by the adversary, and a security definition, and given a protocol, decide whether the protocol is secure in the symbolic model.

• ... given a set of deduction rules and a given message, show that the message can be deduced (e.g., by drawing a derivation tree).

• Good luck!