MTAT.07.017
Applied Cryptography

Hash functions and HMAC

University of Tartu

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Hash function

A hash function is a function that takes an arbitrary block of data and returns a fixed-size unique bit string representation.

Related terms: hash, message digest, fingerprint, checksum
Cryptographic hash function

Properties:

• Easy to compute hash value (fast)
• Hard to restore message from hash (one-way)
• Hard to find messages with the same hash (collision resistant)
• Similar messages have a very different hashes (avalanche effect)

Attacks:

• Collision attack:
  $\text{hash}(x) = \text{hash}(y)$ | find any $x$ and $y$ such that $x \neq y$

• (First) Preimage attack:
  $\text{hash}(x) = h$ | given $h$, find any $x$

• Second preimage attack:
  $\text{hash}(x) = \text{hash}(y)$ | given $x$ and $\text{hash}(x)$, find $y \neq x$
“In cryptography, a **brute-force attack**, or exhaustive key search [...] might be used when it is not possible to take advantage of other weaknesses in an encryption system. It consists of systematically checking all possible keys or passwords until the correct one is found.”


E.g.: If a cryptosystem which has 56-bit key can be brute-forced using $2^{56}$ operations\(^1\) then the cryptosystem has security level of 56 bits.

- $2^{128}$ operations infeasible
- $2^{80}$ become feasible

Note, $2^{81}$ operations take twice the time of $2^{80}$ ($2^{128}$ vs $2^{256}$).

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\(^1\) The term “operation” is not defined.
Cryptographic hash functions

- **MD5** – 128-bit output
  - collision attack in $2^{2^{24.1}}$ (brute-force $2^{64}$)
  - chosen-prefix collision attack in $2^{39}$

- **SHA-1** – 160-bit output
  - theoretical practical collision attack in $2^{63.1}$ (brute-force $2^{80}$)
  - chosen-prefix collision attack in $2^{63.4}$

- **SHA-256** – 256-bit output
- **SHA-512** – 512-bit output
- **SHA-3** – 224/256/384/512-bit output
Data identification and integrity verification

- Integrity and authenticity of distributed files
- Distribution of MS Windows updates
- Disk imaging in digital forensics
- Remote file comparison (rsync)
Server-side password storage

LAW & DISORDER / CIVILIZATION & DISCONTENTS

Sony hacked yet again, plaintext passwords, e-mails, DOB posted
The hackers of Lulz Security have broken into yet more Sony websites, this ...

by Peter Bright - June 3 2011, 4:06am EEST

Hello, I am Idahc a Lebanese Hacker
I was bored and I play the game of the year: "hacker vs Sony"
I hacked little database of 120 user with sql injection......
site: http://apps.pro.sony.eu/

username password mobile office email website

- ascul +44 7818 6a dam@di
- JafarAbd ourfar 145899
- sterChamp manter 1 1522
- arth +44 7887 82
- ralo +44 675922
- bern +34 630 165
- marie c68763c0c7z 465cfd
- the Arghe +38699
- van vanbar +32 45
- loc locbon +44 (6)
- mal malbru +33 6
- Johansen senato 91355

- Solution – store password hashes in database
  - Compare received plaintext password with hash from db
**Server-side password storage**

```sql
mysql> SELECT username, password FROM users;
+------------+------------------------------------------+
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>username</th>
<th>password</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
+------------+------------------------------------------+
| jeff | b1b3773a05c0ed0176787a4f1574ff0075f7521e |
| katrin | 2730f2c29354932611d328cfff0c9f01e10328ec |
| mike | e72e941812b920c908bba17798d5e27ef627912 |
+------------+------------------------------------------+
```

**Free Password Hash Cracker**

Enter up to 10 hashes:

```
1. b1b3773a05c0ed0176787a4f1574ff0075f7521e
2. 2730f2c29354932611d328cfff0c9f01e10328ec
3. e72e941812b920c908bba17798d5e27ef627912
```

**Supports:** LM, NTLM, md2, md4, md5, md5-half, sha1, sha1(sha1_bin()), sha224, sha256, sha384, sha512, ripeMD160, whirlpool, MySQL 4.1+

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hash</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>b1b3773a05c0ed0176787a4f1574ff0075f7521e</td>
<td>sha1</td>
<td>qwerly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2730f2c29354932611d328cfff0c9f01e10328ec</td>
<td>sha1</td>
<td>hillary99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e72e941812b920c908bba17798d5e27ef627912</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Not found</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Solution – add user-specific salt to the password**

  ```python
db_salt = os.urandom(8).encode('hex')
db_password = hashlib.sha1(password + db_salt).hexdigest()
```
Server-side password storage

mysql> SELECT username, password, salt FROM users;
+------------+------------------------------------------+------------------+
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>username</th>
<th>password</th>
<th>salt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>jeff</td>
<td>0771580376c18f7faeae9de565ff663eef8f8c5cc</td>
<td>7d3a5cc67f7f28aa9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>katrin</td>
<td>9c70ccbf02e58be4ebed4a93c26d375895187</td>
<td>df9372246bfc8d0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mike</td>
<td>622cd81265db68c3b2616400f312c2a7096f5848</td>
<td>9a73764e2bf40dbb8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
+------------+------------------------------------------+------------------+

• No benefit in building password specific lookup table
• Even the same passwords will have different hash
Server-side password storage

- Brute-force cracking still possible:

```
>>> hashlib.sha1('qwerty'+'7d3a5ccd7fc28aa9').hexdigest()
'0771580376c18f7faeae9de565ff663eef8c5cc'
```

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MD5</td>
<td>23,070.7 M/s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHA-1</td>
<td>7,973.8 M/s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHA-256</td>
<td>3,110.2 M/s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHA-512</td>
<td>267.1 M/s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTLM</td>
<td>44,035.3 M/s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES</td>
<td>185.1 M/s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPA/WPA2</td>
<td>348.0 k/s</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table: GPU speed

- Slow down brute-force by arbitrary factor using iterated hash: \( h(h(h(x)))) \)
  - Trade-off: performance vs cost of brute-forcing
  - Goal is to increase asymmetry

- Recommended to use: bcrypt, scrypt (RAM-intensive)
Server-side password storage

Task: Calculate the security level of password hashes stored in a company X database. Company’s X password security policy requires password to be exactly 7 lowercase letters.

- Number of letters in English alphabet: 26
- Hash operations required:
  - to brute-force 1-letter password: 26
  - to brute-force 2-letter password: $26 \times 26$
  - to brute-force 3-letter password: $26 \times 26 \times 26$
  - to brute-force 7-letter password: $26^7$

$$26^7 = 8031810176 \approx 2^{32}$$

If using 2000 iterations:

$$2^{32} \times 2000 = 2^{32} \times 2^{11} \approx 2^{43}$$

Password storage has 43-bit security level.\(^2\)

\(^2\)Assuming user chooses letters randomly.
Commitment scheme

Here is the proof of my clairvoyant powers – next U.S. president will be SHA256(x)=d99d0b129d5864e1813438a885034452...

• Binding – due to collision resistance of SHA256

• Hiding – due to one-wayness of SHA256

```python
>>> for candidate in [b'Joe Biden', b'Bernie Sanders', b'Donald Trump']:
...    print(hashlib.sha256(candidate).hexdigest(), candidate)
...d99d0b129d5864e1813438a885034452... Joe Biden
d181f00b6eb6ae128e950e8a2bc39a51... Bernie Sanders
e4f2e1f0e2ae4d3ce7018cf3b4f3577c... Donald Trump
```

• Improve hiding property by adding randomness

```python
>>> prediction = b'Joe Biden|' + os.urandom(16)
>>> hashlib.sha256(prediction).hexdigest()
'9b8ca016ea530921e2b7bd9046424441...'
>>> prediction
b'Joe Biden|\xdeg\x14\xb0\xb1h\x88\x83+%u\xa6x\xfe\xc5'
```

• Function must be secure against chosen-prefix collision attack
Coin flipping over phone

How to generate random number from 0 to 99 over phone:

1. Alice: “my commitment value (SHA256(x)) is 108c995b953c8a35561103e2014cf828…”

2. Bob: “my value is 84”

3. Alice: “my value was 65“

4. Bob checks if SHA256(“65”) = “108c995b953c8a35561103e2014cf828…”

Random number generated:

65 + 84 = 149 mod 100 = 49
Hash-based PRNG

```
sha1(seed) sha1(seed + ”0”)
sha1(sha1(seed)) sha1(seed + ”1”)
sha1(sha1(sha1(seed))) sha1(seed + ”2”)
sha1(sha1(sha1(sha1(seed)))) sha1(seed + ”3”)
...
```

```python
import hashlib
def hash_prng(seed):
i = 0
while True:
    print(hashlib.sha1(seed + str(i).encode()).hexdigest())
i += 1

hash_prng(b’fookey’)
```

- Standardized construction – Hash-DRBG (NIST SP 800-90)
- If we have a PRNG we can build a stream cipher
Hash chain

- Linking-based time-stamping
- Also known as a blockchain
Hash tree (Merkle tree)

- Easy to prove that a node belongs to the tree
- To prove that “Data block 3” is part of the tree $h_{1-4}$:
  - “Data block 3”
  - “$h_4$”
  - “$h_{1-2}$”
- Used in BitTorrent to identify downloads
HMAC: Hash-based Message Authentication Code

- A valid MAC cannot be produced without knowing the key
- Naive implementation $\text{hash}(\text{key} + \text{message})$ is vulnerable!
  - Safe to use HMAC construction (RFC 2104)
- MAC does not guarantee freshness of the message
- Can we use MAC as a digital signature?
Questions

• What are the properties of hash function?
• What attacks cryptographic hash function must resist?
• What does the size of hash function output influence?
• What is a “security level” in cryptography?
• What is commitment scheme useful for?
• Why it is better to store hashed passwords in db?
• How can we increase the security level of password hashing?
• How can we create encryption scheme from hash function?
• What is HMAC useful for?
• Why using MD5/SHA1 for HMAC is not insecure?
Task: HMAC – 3p

Implement a tool that calculates and verifies the integrity of a file.

$ ./hmac.py
Usage:
-verify <filename>
-mac <filename>

$ ./hmac.py -mac somefile
[?] Enter key: secretkey
[+] Calculated HMAC-SHA256: f5e94378cae5a3d0836e145f28807bb7076d28cd22b2481d45f92a904be9d2e8
[+] Writing HMAC DigestInfo to somefile.hmac

$ ./hmac.py -verify somefile
[+] Reading HMAC DigestInfo from somefile.hmac
[+] HMAC-SHA256 digest: f5e94378cae5a3d0836e145f28807bb7076d28cd22b2481d45f92a904be9d2e8
[?] Enter key: secretkey
[+] Calculated HMAC-SHA256: f5e94378cae5a3d0836e145f28807bb7076d28cd22b2481d45f92a904be9d2e8
[+] HMAC verification successful!

$ dumpasn1 somefile.hmac
  0 49: SEQUENCE {
    2 13:  SEQUENCE {
      4 9:  OBJECT IDENTIFIER sha-256 (2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 1)
      15 0:  NULL
    :  }
 17 32:  OCTET STRING
    :  F5 E9 43 78 CA E5 A3 D0 83 6E 14 5F 28 80 7B B7
    :  07 6D 28 CD 22 B2 48 1D 45 F9 2A 90 4B E9 D2 E8
    :  }
DigestInfo

DigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
    digestAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
    digest OCTET STRING
}

AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
    algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
    parameters ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL
}

$ dumpasn1 hashobject
0  33: SEQUENCE {
2   9: SEQUENCE {
4   5:    OBJECT IDENTIFIER sha1 (1 3 14 3 2 26)
11  0:      NULL
    : }
13  20:    OCTET STRING DA 39 A3 EE 5E 6B 4B 0D 32 55 BF ...
    : }

• Standard structure to store algorithm and calculated digest
• Defined in PKCS#1 v1.5 signature creation (RFC 2313)
• Our hash functions have no parameters (ASN.1 NULL)
Task: HMAC

- Use Python's `hashlib` and `hmac` library
e.g., `hmac.new(b'somekey', None, hashlib.md5)`
- Must support hashing of huge files
  - Read file by 512 byte chunks
  - Feed chunks sequentially to `hash.update()`
  - Finally call `hash.digest()`
- HMAC digest must be written to "_.hmac" file using DigestInfo ASN.1 structure
  - Use your own ASN.1 encoder
    - Please embed your encoder in your solution
  - For decoding use `pyasn1`
- MAC'er must use HMAC-SHA256
- Verifier must support HMAC-MD5, HMAC-SHA1 and HMAC-SHA256 (algorithm must be read from DigestInfo)
  - OID for MD5: 1.2.840.113549.2.5
  - OID for SHA1: 1.3.14.3.2.26
  - OID for SHA256: 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1
Task: Test Cases

$ echo -e -n "\x01" > file_sha256
$ python hmac.py -mac file_sha256
[?] Enter key: testkey
[+] Calculated HMAC-SHA256: a8be648dd48738b964391a00d4522fe988d10e3d5b2dbf8629a3dcbc0ce93ffd
[+] Writing HMAC DigestInfo to file_sha256.hmac
$ python hmac.py -verify file_sha256
[+] Reading HMAC DigestInfo from file_sha256.hmac
[+] HMAC-SHA256 digest: a8be648dd48738b964391a00d4522fe988d10e3d5b2dbf8629a3dcbc0ce93ffd
[?] Enter key: testkey
[+] Calculated HMAC-SHA256: a8be648dd48738b964391a00d4522fe988d10e3d5b2dbf8629a3dcbc0ce93ffd
[+] HMAC verification successful!

$ wget https://bitbucket.org/appcrypto/2020/raw/master/03/hmac_testcases.tgz
$ tar -zxvf hmac_testcases.tgz
$ python hmac.py -verify file_md5
[+] Reading HMAC DigestInfo from file_md5.hmac
[+] HMAC-MD5 digest: 9e8031ab9d85a5fa0753344bc8c31a2f
[?] Enter key: secretkey
[+] Calculated HMAC-MD5: 9e8031ab9d85a5fa0753344bc8c31a2f
[+] HMAC verification successful!

$ python hmac.py -verify file_sha1
[+] Reading HMAC DigestInfo from file_sha1.hmac
[+] HMAC-SHA1 digest: ebf4fc1a84d5f9fcbdb1b7c8d5625ac9f5b4c81
[?] Enter key: secretkey
[+] Calculated HMAC-SHA1: ebf4fc1a84d5f9fcbdb1b7c8d5625ac9f5b4c81
[+] HMAC verification successful!

$ python hmac.py -verify file_sha256
[+] Reading HMAC DigestInfo from file_sha256.hmac
[+] HMAC-SHA256 digest: c40932474350a3f29a9f800e6b6429c64b7526800f8701ae9b4e73db8a3b700
[?] Enter key: secretkey
[+] Calculated HMAC-SHA256: 737f438db779461e6163aa236797099f008b154de6f5741843a549866a657a5fd
[-] Wrong key or message has been manipulated!
$ sudo apt install python3-pyasn1
$ python3
>>> from pyasn1.codec.der import decoder
>>> der = open('asn1.der', 'rb').read()
>>> decoder.decode(der)
(<Sequence value object at 0x7f2a0cc3cf10 componentType=<NamedTypes object at 0x7f2a0cc128d0 tags 0:32:16-128:32:0 subtypeSpec=<ConstraintsIntersection object at 0x7f2a0cc12850 sizeSpec=<ConstraintsIntersection object at 0x7f2a0cc12890> payload [<Set value object at 0x7f2a0cc3c890 componentType=[...]] <UTCTime value object at 0x7f2a0cc3ca50 tagSet <TagSet object at 0x7f2a0cc3c590 tags 0:0:23> encoding us-ascii payload [150223010900Z]>, ''),
>>> decoder.decode(der)[0][0][2]
<Integer value object at 0x7f2a0cc3ced0 tagSet <TagSet object at 0x7f2a0cc3ca90 tags 0:0:2-128:32:11> payload [65407]>
>>> int(decoder.decode(der)[0][0][2])
65407
>>> decoder.decode(der)[0][0][2].__class__.__name__
'Integer'
• Can’t handle large (>3MB) DER encoded structures
• Can’t handle DER structures with implicit tagging