MTAT.07.017
Applied Cryptography

Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Advanced Features

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Client usually is authenticated on the application level by some shared secret (e.g., password). This can go wrong:

- Server can be impersonated
- Server can be compromised
- Password can be reused in another service
- Password can be guessed
- Password can be phished
Client Certificate Authentication

- **CertificateVerify** – signature over all handshake messages
- Can **CertificateVerify** be reused in another handshake?
- Why **CertificateVerify** is after **ClientKeyExchange**?
- Client’s **Certificate** is sent before **ChangeCipherSpec**
- Client proves his identity by signing and not by decrypting
Session Resumption

- Resumed TLS connections share the same “master secret”
- Several TLS connections can belong to one TLS session
- If TLS connection fails, TLS session becomes non-resumable
- Abbreviated handshake improves performance, saving:
  - 1 round-trip time across the network
  - 1 asymmetric crypto operation
Renegotiation

- Any party can initiate negotiation of a new TLS session:
  - Client by sending ClientHello
  - Server by sending HelloRequest
- Handshake messages of the new TLS session are protected by the cipher suite negotiated in the previous TLS session
- Used by server to renegotiate stronger cipher suite or to request client certificate authentication if on application level client tries to access resources that require such security measure
- Client initiated renegotiation usually disabled on the server
Certificate request on renegotiation
If the Key Exchange type is RSA:

- If we can get a hold of the server’s RSA private key, we can decrypt the Client Key Exchange message and read the pre-master secret key. No other heavy work need be done.

- Valid for life of certificate
Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

\[ (2^5)^4 = 2^{5 \cdot 4} = (2^4)^5 \]

- In practice, multiplicative group of integers modulo \( p \) is used
- Discrete logarithm problem
  - hard to find \( x \), given \( 2^x = 32 \mod p \)
- Secure against passive eavesdropping
Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

- **ServerKeyExchange** contains DH group, server’s DH public key and server’s RSA signature over DH public key, client randomness and server randomness
- **ClientKeyExchange** contains client’s DH public key
- How is “pre-master secret” calculated?
- Handshake requires two public key operations (DH + RSA)
- Used by TLS_(EC)DHE_RSA_WITH_* cipher suites
- Achieves perfect forward secrecy
Perfect Forward Secrecy

Benefits:

- Attacker who has compromised RSA private key cannot decrypt previous TLS traffic
- Attacker who has compromised RSA private key has to execute active MITM attack
- Attacker has to crack $x$ keys to decrypt $x$ sessions made to the server

PFS is achieved by using the long-term private key to authenticate a short-term key that is used to encrypt the actual data.
Extensions

- **ClientHello** can contain length-prefixed extensions
- **ServerHello** will contain response to client’s extensions
- **Most popular extensions:**
  - Server Name Indication (SNI) extension (RFC 3546)
  ```
  Extension: server_name
  Type: server_name (0x0000)
  Length: 17
  Server Name Indication extension
  Server Name list length: 15
  Server Name Type: host_name (0)
  Server Name length: 12
  Server Name: www.eesti.ee
  ```
  - TLS Session Tickets (RFC 5077)
  ```
  Extension: SessionTicket TLS
  Type: SessionTicket TLS (0x0023)
  Length: 180
  Data (180 bytes)
  ```
  - Elliptic Curves (RFC 4492)
  ```
  Extension: elliptic_curves
  Type: elliptic_curves (0x000a)
  Length: 8
  Elliptic Curves Length: 6
  Elliptic curves (3 curves)
  Elliptic curve: secp256r1 (0x0017)
  Elliptic curve: secp384r1 (0x0018)
  Elliptic curve: secp521r1 (0x0019)
  ```
  - Heartbeat (RFC 6520)
Other authentication methods

- **TLS-PSK (RFC 4279)** – pre-shared key
  - PSK identities up to 128 octets in length
  - PSKs up to 64 octets in length
  - TLS_PSK_WITH_ *
  - TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ *
  - TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ *

- **TLS-SRP (RFC 5054)** – low-entropy password
  - Uses discrete logarithms
  - Prevents off-line brute force attacks
  - User name appended to ClientHello in SRP extension
  - TLS_SR_P_SHA_WITH_ *
  - TLS_SR_P_SHA_RSA_WITH_ *
  - TLS_SR_P_SHA_DSS_WITH_ *

- **DH_anon** – both client and server remain anonymous
  - TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ *
  - No Certificate messages allowed
  - opportunistic encryption (HTTP/2.0)
Task

Implement TLS v1.2 client that can obtaining HTTP response.

$ python tls_client.py https://127.0.0.1:4433/
--> client_hello()
<--- handshake()
    <--- server_hello()
        [+] server randomness: 57359448EF20879409852D451B1A3089D620A95944BF8092
        [+] server timestamp: 2018-04-26 11:46:00
        [+] TLS session ID:
        [+] Cipher suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
    <--- handshake()
        <--- certificate()
            [+] Server certificate length: 554
    <--- handshake()
        <--- server_hello_done()
--> client_key_exchange()
--> change_cipher_spec()
--> finished()
<--- change_cipher_spec()
<--- handshake()
    <--- finished()
--> application_data()
GET / HTTP/1.0
<--- application_data()
HTTP/1.0 200 OK
Hello!
[+] Closing TCP connection!
Task

Client has to support TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA cipher suite

- Template contains fully implemented PRF(), derive_master_secret(), derive_keys(), encrypt(), decrypt() and client/server finished hash calculation code
  - Make sure you provide correct inputs to these functions (!!!)

- Your code should work on www.ut.ee.

- Grading:
  - 2 points if a server accepts your ClientKeyExchange message
  - 2 points if a server accepts your Finished message
  - 1 point if your code can show HTTP response

- You can use tls_server.py for development (port 4433)
- Wireshark “Decode As” – “TCP Destination 4433” – “SSL”
Debugging

$ python tls_server.py --port 4433
[+] Connection from 127.0.0.1:38452

---- handshake()

  <-- client_hello()
  [+] version: 0303
  [+] client randomness: 5AE1C2C0A89495A695EF7945E6E29CE3AE6E42673172266072BF54EE1BB9
  [+] client timestamp: 2018-04-26 15:14:56
  [+] TLS session ID:
  [+] Cipher suites:
    TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
  [+] Compression methods:
    null
  [+] Extensions length: 0

-- server_hello()

  [+] server randomness: 5AE1C2C036B7A4C11ABF8450E64B3EC52D188A936C12DEC1FCEDF8BE5DA551F1
  [+] server timestamp: 2018-04-26 15:14:56
  [+] TLS session ID:
  [+] Cipher suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA

-- certificate()

  [+] Server certificate length: 554

-- server_hello_done()

---- handshake()

  <-- client_key_exchange()
  [+] PreMaster length: 128
  [+] PreMaster (encrypted): ... 7b53af00cddbb11f25fed5c8733d06ef4be03624139e96a4e61c8f0bba3e5ff0c89857b6057cfc9e5c9ed66c713125dc39041bcf0ceb0684d4cda29a39
  [+] PreMaster: 030362b7dc1497d02d377d34c30a446839214f32d48f5163a2979d614019ed8778048ff8c60cd97757b88a8bd6afdc5a

---- change_cipher_spec()

  [+] Applying cipher suite:
    [+] master_secret = PRF(030362b7dc1497d02d377d34c30a446839214f32d48f5163a2979d614019ed8778048ff8c60cd97757b88a8bf)
    [+] master_secret_c182ff31961f326b777b9ec627ba4b17b2ea9b0a606ba1c04be2d0b8347aa3a3d92fe7de13880f7dbbf9909fbc
    [+] client_mac_key: 0cdc5de9428c8f56ffa662df3bf3837ce866623
    [+] server_mac_key: a304d7dae33435a757e0eb4efb2ca062354aeefbf
    [+] client_enc_key: 82f955c772a4e9b39c009188a149976f
    [+] server_enc_key: e9caad52b25f872a96b8d2d5657c7835

---- handshake()

  <-- finished()

  [+] client_verify (received): cb0a97cba1fddacda50160c

  [+] client_verify (calculated): cb0a97cba1fddacda50160c

-- change_cipher_spec()

-- finished()

-- application_data()

GET / HTTP/1.0
-- application_data()

HTTP/1.0 200 OK

Hello!
[+] Closing TCP connection!
$ python tls_client.py https://www.swedbank.ee/
  --> client_hello()
  <<< alert()
      [-] fatal: 40

$ python tls_client.py https://www.nordea.ee/
  --> client_hello()
  <<< alert()
      [-] fatal: 40

$ python tls_client.py https://www.eesti.ee/
  --> client_hello()
  <<< alert()
      [-] fatal: 40

$ python tls_client.py https://www.ut.ee/
  --> client_hello()
  <<< handshake()
      <<< server_hello()
          [+] server randomness: 572C8EF6A59AB7C76584B3E988D1185C3010E67CDF2975FB9C5B22F898674BE
          [+] server timestamp: 2018-04-26 11:32:40
          [+] TLS session ID: D6EF3177BAFBA2A28399A0D2E08DE4750527000BCACCD75D21A814ECDA1BBA87
          [+] Cipher suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
      <<< handshake()
      <<< certificate()
          [+] Server certificate length: 1604
      <<< handshake()
      <<< server_hello_done()
  -- client_key_exchange()
  --> change_cipher_spec()
  --> finished()
  <<< change_cipher_spec()
  <<< handshake()
  <<< finished()
  -- application_data()
GET / HTTP/1.0
  <<< application_data()
HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Date: Thu, 26 Apr 2018 12:17:12 GMT
Server: Apache
Location: http://www.ut.ee/
Content-Length: 225
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1

[+] Closing TCP connection!
Bonus (2 points)

Implement support for: **TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA**

```
$ python tls_client.py https://www.swedbank.ee/
---> client_hello()
<---- handshake()
    <--- server_hello()
        [+] server randomness: FB283915E3BC90BCC799E0A39049725328E07C84DEA5BF772EA507BD07BF3AFF
        [+] server timestamp: 2103-07-13 00:01:09
        [+] TLS session ID: F2A8F4C246EC69A7DA70A4B4AF35102A6A083BBBF7CCF9DF92D28D817EC5603F
        [+] Cipher suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
<---- handshake()
    <--- certificate()
        [+] Server certificate length: 1615
<---- handshake()
    <--- server_hello_done()
--> client_key_exchange()
--> change_cipher_spec()
--> finished()
<---- change_cipher_spec()
<---- handshake()
    <--- finished()
--> application_data()
GET / HTTP/1.0
<---- application_data()
HTTP/1.0 302 Found
Location: https://www.swedbank.ee/
Connection: close
Content-Length: 0
[+] Closing TCP connection!
```

- No need to implement CBC youself
  - Use: `AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)`
- 16 byte IV is prepended to ciphertext
- Changes required to: `client_hello()`, `parsehandshake()`, `encrypt()`, `decrypt()`