

Exercise (Insecurity of three round Feistel cipher). Show that the three-round Feistel cipher $\text{FEISTEL}_{f_1, f_2, f_3}(L_0 \| R_0)$ is not pseudorandom if the adversary can also make decryption queries.

Solution. Let $L_0 \| R_0$ be an arbitrary message. Then the corresponding ciphertexts is

$$\begin{aligned} L_3 &= R_0 \oplus f_2(L_0 \oplus f_1(R_0)) , \\ R_3 &= L_0 \oplus f_1(R_0) \oplus f_3(R_0 \oplus f_2(L_0 \oplus f_1(R_0))) . \end{aligned}$$

Now the ciphertext of a modified message $L_0 \oplus \delta \| R_0$ is

$$\begin{aligned} L'_3 &= R_0 \oplus f_2(L_0 \oplus \delta \oplus f_1(R_0)) , \\ R'_3 &= L_0 \oplus \delta \oplus f_1(R_0) \oplus f_3(R_0 \oplus f_2(L_0 \oplus \delta \oplus f_1(R_0))) . \end{aligned}$$

As a next step, we can use decryption operation to find $L_0^* \| R_0^*$ such that the corresponding ciphertext is

$$\begin{aligned} L_3^* &= L'_3 \oplus 0 = R_0 \oplus f_2(L_0 \oplus \delta \oplus f_1(R_0)) , \\ R_3^* &= R'_3 \oplus \delta = L_0 \oplus f_1(R_0) \oplus f_3(R_0 \oplus f_2(L_0 \oplus \delta \oplus f_1(R_0))) . \end{aligned}$$

By the definition of the Feistel cipher we can express

$$\begin{aligned} L_2^* &= R_3^* \oplus f_3(L_3^*) = L_0 \oplus f_1(R_0) = L_2 , \\ L_1^* &= R_2^* \oplus f_2(L_2^*) = R_2^* \oplus f_2(L_2) = L_3^* \oplus f_2(L_2) , \\ R_0^* &= L_1^* = L_3^* \oplus f_2(L_2) . \end{aligned}$$

Similarly, we can derive

$$R_0 = L_1 = R_2 \oplus f_2(L_2) = L_3 \oplus f_2(L_2)$$

and thus we have obtained a relation

$$R_0^* \oplus L_3^* = f_2(L_2) = R_0 \oplus L_3$$

that holds with probability 1. The same relation between input and output pairs holds with probability

$$\frac{1}{2^n - 2}$$

for random permutation. Hence, the computational difference is really small for the three round Feistel cipher if decryption operations are allowed.