MTAT.07.003 Cryptology II
Spring 2010 / Exercise Session II

1. Let $\mathbb{G}$ be a finite group such that all elements $y \in \mathbb{G}$ can be expressed as powers of $g \in \mathbb{G}$. Then the discrete logarithm problem is following. Given $y \in \mathbb{G}$, find a smallest integer x such that $g^x = y$ in finite group $\mathbb{G}$. Discrete logarithm problem is known to be hard in general, i.e., all universal algorithms for computing logarithm run in time $\Omega(\sqrt{|\mathbb{G}|})$.

   (a) Show that for a fixed group $\mathbb{G}$, there exists a Turing machine that finds the discrete logarithm for every $y \in \mathbb{G}$ in $O(\log_2 |\mathbb{G}|)$ steps.

   (b) Show that for a fixed group $\mathbb{G}$, there exists an analogous Random Access Machine that achieves the same efficiency.

   (c) Generalise the previous construction and show that for every fixed function $f : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^m$ there exists a Turing machine and a Random Access Machine such that they compute $f(x)$ for every input $x \in \{0,1\}^n$ in $O(n + m)$ steps.

   (d) Are these constructions also valid in practise? Explain why these inconsistencies disappear when we formalise algorithms through universal computing devices.

   Hint: What is the time-complexity of binary search algorithms?

2. Consider a classical Turing machine without internal working tapes, i.e., the Turning machine has a single one-sided (input) tape that initially contains inputs and must contain the desired output after the execution.

   (a) Show that all sorting algorithms take at least $\Omega(n^2)$ steps where n is the total length of inputs $x_1, \dots, x_k$. What is the time-complexity of best sorting algorithms? Explain this contradiction.

   (b) Does the minimal time-complexity change if the Turing machine has internal working tapes?

   (c) Sketch how one can simulate execution of Random Access Machines on a Turing machine. What is the corresponding overhead?

   ($\star$) Construct a set of tasks that can be implemented significantly more efficiently on Turing machines with $\ell+1$ working tapes than on Turing machines with ℓ tapes.

   Hint: It is well-known fact that reversing n-bit string takes $\Omega(n^2)$ steps on a Turing machine without working tapes.

3. Let $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2, \mathcal{A}_3, \mathcal{A}_5$ be algorithms for finding discrete logarithm such that the success probability is bounded

$$49 \cdot \mathsf{Adv}_{\mathbb{G}}^{\mathsf{dl}}(\mathcal{A}_i) \geq \Pr\left[x \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_i(y) : y = g^x\right] \geq 7 \cdot \mathsf{Adv}_{\mathbb{G}}^{\mathsf{dl}}(\mathcal{A}_i)$$

if $\pi(y) = 1$. Find tight lower and upper bounds of $\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathbb{G}}^{\mathsf{dl}}(\mathcal{A})$ for the following adversary $\mathcal{B}$

$$\mathcal{B}(y)$$
$$\left[\begin{array}{l} i \twoheadleftarrow \{1, 2, 3\}, x \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_i(y) \\ \text{if } \pi_i(y) = 1 \text{ then} \\ \quad \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{if } g^x \neq y \wedge \pi_4(y) = 1 \text{ then return } \mathcal{A}_4(y) \\ \text{else return } x \end{array}\right. \\ \text{else if } \pi_5(y) = 1 \text{ then return } \mathcal{A}_5(y) \\ \text{else return } \mathcal{A}_1(y) \end{array}\right.$$

provided that $\Pr\left[y \twoheadleftarrow \mathbb{G} : \pi_i(y) = 1\right] = \frac{1}{42+i}$ and $\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathbb{G}}^{\mathsf{dl}}(\mathcal{A}_i) = i^2 \cdot \varepsilon$.

4. Let $\mathbb{G}$ be a finite q-element group such that all elements $y \in \mathbb{G}$ can be expressed as powers of $g \in \mathbb{G}$.

   (a) Let $\mathcal{A}$ be an algorithm that always finds a discrete logarithm with the expected running-time τ. Construct a t-time algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ that fails with probability 2^{-80} and its running-time t is linear in τ.

   (b) Let $\mathcal{A}$ be an algorithm for finding the highest bit of discrete logarithm such that $\Pr\left[\mathcal{A}(y) \text{ guesses correctly}\right] \geq \varepsilon > \frac{1}{2}$ for any $y \in \mathbb{G}$. Construct an algorithm that fails with probability 2^{-80}.

   (c) Let $\mathcal{A}$ be a discrete logarithm finder that uses algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ five times to get inputs for the aggregating algorithm $\mathcal{C}$

$$\mathcal{B}(y)$$
$$\left[\begin{array}{l} x_1 \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(y), \ldots, x_5 \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(y) \\ \text{return } \mathcal{C}_1(x_1, \ldots, x_5) \end{array}\right.$$

   The construction guarantees that $\mathcal{C}$ succeeds in finding the discrete logarithm of y if all x_i are correct. Find the $\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathbb{G}}^{\mathsf{dl}}(\mathcal{B})$ if

$$\Pr\left[y \leftarrow \mathbb{G} : \text{the output of } \mathcal{A}(y) \text{ is correct}\right] = \varepsilon \ .$$

   Hints: Use Chebyshev's, Jensen's and Markov's inequalities.

5. A cryptosystem is a triple of algorithms $(\mathcal{K}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{D})$ such that the equality $\mathcal{D}(\mathcal{E}(m, k), k) = m$ holds for all messages $m \in \mathcal{M}$ and keys $k \leftarrow \mathcal{K}$. Cryptosystem is perfectly secure if a ciphertext c reveals nothing about the corresponding message m, i.e., $\Pr\left[m|c\right] = \Pr\left[m\right]$.

   (a) Prove that cryptosystem is perfectly secure only if $H(m|c) = H(m)$. What about the implication to the other direction?

   (b) Show that $H(k, m, c) \geq H(m|c) + H(c)$. For which enciphering algorithms does the equality $H(k, m, c) = H(m|c) + H(c)$ hold?

(c) Show that $H(k, m, c) = H(k) + H(c|k)$. Conclude that cryptosystem is perfectly secure only if $H(k) \geq H(m)$.

(d) Show that $H(k|c) = H(m) + H(k) + H(c|m, k) - H(c)$. What does the result mean in practise?

6. Estimate how much time is needed to break the following three file encryption methods without using cipher-specific attacks.

   (a) The file is encrypted with 128-bit AES cipher and the key is stored in a special file that is protected with a password. Namely, the key is encrypted with another key that is derived form the password.

   (b) The file is encrypted with old 56-bit DES cipher and the key is stored in the special file that is encrypted with a public key. The corresponding secret key is stored in the ID card.

   (c) The file is encrypted with 80-bit IDEA cipher and the key is stored in the special file that is encrypted with a public key. The corresponding secret key is stored in the TPM chip.

7. There are many ways how to attack a standard e-banking system. First, an attacker can distribute malware that logs all kinds of passwords. Secondly, an attacker can send out forged e-mails that instruct bank customers to send passwords to a certain mail account. Thirdly, an attacker can attack the underlying cryptographic protection mechanism. When the attacker has a control over the account, he or she has to withdraw the money through an auxiliary account belonging to a mule. This poses a risk as mules do not always deliver the money to attacker's account.

Compute a success probabilities of all attack scenarios and find the one with highest expected gain, given only some estimates of conditional probabilities. Namely, let Malware, Phishing and CryptoBreak denote success in the first attack step. Let Detect denote the event that an unauthorised bank transfer or the attack itself is detected. Finally, let Cheat denote the event that mule cheats and the attacker does not get the money. Then

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
\Pr[\mathsf{Malware}] = 10^{-3} & \Pr[\mathsf{Detect}|\mathsf{Malware}] = 10^{-4} \\
\Pr[\mathsf{Phishing}] = 10^{-2} & \Pr[\mathsf{Detect}|\mathsf{Phishing}] = 1 \\
\Pr[\mathsf{CryptoBreak}] = 10^{-27} & \Pr[\mathsf{Detect}|\mathsf{CryptoBreak}] = 0 \\
\Pr[\mathsf{Detect}|\mathsf{Draw}\ 100] = 10^{-2} & \Pr[\mathsf{Cheat}|\mathsf{Draw}\ 100] = 0 \\
\Pr[\mathsf{Detect}|\mathsf{Draw}\ 1000] = 10^{-1} & \Pr[\mathsf{Cheat}|\mathsf{Draw}\ 1000] = 10^{-1} \\
\Pr[\mathsf{Detect}|\mathsf{Draw}\ 10000] = 1 & \Pr[\mathsf{Cheat}|\mathsf{Draw}\ 1000] = 10^{-2}
\end{array}
$$

What is probability that the corresponding attacks remain unnoticed?

($\star$) Let $\mathcal{A}$ be a solver for the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem with the advantage $\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathbb{G}}^{\mathsf{cdh}}(\mathcal{A}) = \varepsilon > \frac{1}{2}$. Now consider a success amplification by

majority voting

$$\mathcal{B}^{\mathcal{A}}(x,y)$$

> For $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$ do
>> $a \xleftarrow{u} \mathbb{Z}_q, b \xleftarrow{u} \mathbb{Z}_q$
>> $z_i \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(xg^a, yg^b) \cdot x^{-b} y^{-a} g^{-ab}$
> Output the most frequent value among $z_1, \dots z_n$.

Find a better lower bound of the advantage $\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathbb{G}}^{\mathsf{cdh}}(\mathcal{B})$ than was given in the lecture. Show that your bound is asymptotically tight.

($\star$) Let $\mathbb{G}$ be a finite q-element group such that all elements $y \in \mathbb{G}$ can be expressed as powers of $g \in \mathbb{G}$. Let $\psi : \mathbb{Z}_q \to \{0, 1\}$ be a non-trivial linear predicate, i.e., $\psi(x + y) = \psi(x) \oplus \psi(y)$ and $\psi(x) \neq 0$ for some x. Show that if there exists an efficient procedure $\mathcal{A}$ with the advantage

$$\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathbb{G}}^{\psi}(\mathcal{A}) = \Pr\left[y \leftarrow \mathbb{G} : \mathcal{A}(y) = \psi(\log y)\right] > \tfrac{1}{2} \ ,$$

then it possible to compute discrete logarithm efficiently, i.e., the running-time of the construction depends linearly on the running-time of $\mathcal{A}$ for fixed advantage $\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathbb{G}}^{\psi}(\mathcal{A})$. How does the running-time depend on $\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathbb{G}}^{\psi}(\mathcal{A})$?

($\star$) Let $\mathbb{G}$ be a finite q-element group such that all elements $y \in \mathbb{G}$ can be expressed as powers of $g \in \mathbb{G}$. Show that if there exists an efficient procedure $\mathcal{A}$ that can always compute the highest bit of $\log y$ then the discrete logarithm problem is easy. Extend the proof to the case where the advantage $\mathsf{Adv}(\mathcal{A}) = \Pr\left[y \leftarrow \mathbb{G} : \mathcal{A}(y) \text{ guesses correctly}\right] > \tfrac{1}{2}$. How does the running-time depend on $\mathsf{Adv}(\mathcal{A})$?