1 One-time-pad

In a brute force attack, one tries every possible key $k$ and tries to decrypt the ciphertext $c$ using $k$. When decrypting $c$ using $k$ yields a valid plaintext (e.g., an English sentence), one has found the key.

Given enough time, one can also enumerate all possible keys for the one-time pad. Thus, given unlimited computational power, one can apply the brute-force attack to the one-time pad. One the other hand, we have proven that the one-time pad has perfect secrecy. Thus is should not be possible to break the one-time pad.

Explain why a brute-force attack fails on the one-time pad (even if one has unlimited time).

Solution

Having perfect secrecy means that any ciphertext can be deciphered to any plaintext, for the appropriate corresponding key. Hence a brute force attack will lead to a wrong coherent plaintext.

2 Security Definition

Your task is to write a security definition in Python (or another language, but we provide a template in Python). The goal of this is to give you a better understanding what security definitions mean, besides just being formulas. We illustrate this by writing the security definition of PRGs in Python:

```python
#!/usr/bin/python3

# For simplicity, we fix domain and range of PRGs here:
# The domain is the set of 32-bit integers
# The random is the set of ten-element lists of 32-bit integers
# (equivalent to 320-bit integers)
import random

# A very bad pseudo-random generator
# Seed is supposed to be a 32-bit integer
# Output is a ten element list of 32-bit integers
def G(seed):
    return [4267243**i*seed % 2**32 for i in range(1,11)]

# The game: it gets a prg and an adversary as arguments
def prg_game(G,adv):
    b = random.randint(0,1) # Random bit
    seed = random.randint(0,2**32-1) # Random seed
    rand = [random.randint(0,2**32-1) for i in range(10)] # Truly random output
    if b==0: badv = adv(G(seed))
    else: badv = adv(rand)
    return b==badv

def adv(rand):
    if rand[1]==4267243*rand[0] % 2**32: return 0
    else: return 1

def test_prg(G,adv):
    num_true = 0
    num_tries = 100000
    for i in range(num_tries):
        if prg_game(G,adv): num_true += 1
    ratio = float(num_true)/num_tries
    print(ratio)

    # An output near 0.5 means no attack
    # An output near 0.0 or 1.0 means a successful attack
    test_prg(G,adv)

Here G is an implementation of a pseudo-random generator (a rather bad one). And
prg_game is a function that implements the game from the security definition of PRGs.
That is, it takes a PRG G, and an adversary adv, and calls adv either with randomness
or the output of G. If the adversary guesses correctly which of the two was the case,
prg_game returns True, else False.

The function test_prg tries out whether a given adversary is successful or not by
counting how often he guesses right. (Of course, this does not replace a proof: a statistic
does not give certainty, and also we cannot know whether other adversaries are successful.
But it illustrates the use of the security definition.)

We have also written an example adversary adv that breaks the PRG G. For simplicity,
let both the message and the key space consist of 32-bit integers. But note that you are
not supposed to use brute force attacks.

Your task:
(a) Write the security definition for IND-OT-CPA as a Python program. (Recall, in IND-OT-CPA, the adversary is called twice, so you will need two functions adv1 and adv2. Also pay attention to the following: the adversary should not be allowed to output messages that are not in the message space.)
(b) Write an adversary that breaks the encryption scheme enc defined in the source code below. (This adversary should have a success probability, as measured by test_indotcpa of at least 0.95.)

Here is a template for your solution. You need to fill in code where there are ???.

#!/usr/bin/python

# For simplicity, the message space and the key space consists of 32-bit integers
# And the ciphertext space consists of all integers (possibly longer)

import random

# A bad encryption scheme
def enc(key,msg):
    return key*msg

# The IND-OT-CPA game
def indotcpa_game(enc,adv1,adv2):
    ???

# The adversary breaking the above encryption scheme
# (Consisting of two functions, since the adversary is invoked twice by the game)
def adv1():
    ???
def adv2(c):
    ???

def test_indotcpa(enc,adv1,adv2):
    num_true = 0
    num_tries = 100000
    for i in range(num_tries):
        if indotcpa_game(enc,adv1,adv2): num_true += 1
    ratio = num_true/num_tries
    print(ratio)

# An output near 0.5 means no attack
Solution

The solution for tasks (a) and (b):

```python
#!/usr/bin/python3

# For simplicity, the message space and the key space consists of 32-bit integers
# And the ciphertext space consists of all integers (possibly longer)

import random

# A bad encryption scheme
def enc(key,msg):
    return key*msg

# The IND-OT-CPA game
def indotcpa_game(enc,adv1,adv2):
    b = random.randint(0,1) # Random bit
    key = random.randint(0,2**32-1) # Random key
    m = adv1()
    assert 0<=m[0]<2**32 # Check that the adversary is outputting valid messages
    assert 0<=m[1]<2**32 # Check that the adversary is outputting valid messages
    c = enc(key,m[b])
    badv = adv2(c)
    assert b==0 or b==1 # Check that the adversary actually returns a bit
    return (badv==b)

# The adversary breaking the above encryption scheme
# (Consisting of two functions, since the adversary is invoked twice by the game)
def adv1():
    return (0,1)
def adv2(c):
    if c==0: return 0
    else: return 1

def test_indotcpa(enc,adv1,adv2):
    num_true = 0
    num_tries = 100000
    for i in range(num_tries):
        if indotcpa_game(enc,adv1,adv2):
            num_true += 1
    print(f"The probability of success is: {num_true/num_tries:.4f}")
```

```
ratio = num_true/num_tries
print(ratio)

# An output near 0.5 means no attack
# An output neat 0.0 or 1.0 means a successful attack
test_indotcpa(enc,adv1,adv2)