


# Practical security analysis: The distribution of attack trees

## Overview

- What is an attack tree?
- AND-nodes, OR-nodes



- Ahto Buldas, Peeter Laud, Jaan Priisalu, Märt Saarepera, Jan Willemson article *“Rational Choice of Security Measures via Multi-Parameter Attack Trees”*
- Parameters:
  - Gains - the gains of the attacker, in case the attack succeeds
  - Costs - the cost of the attack
  - $p$  - the success probability of the attack
  - $\pi$  - the average penalty of an attacker if the attack was successful
  - $\pi_-$  - the average penalty of an attacker if the attack was not successful

- Outcome =  $-\text{Costs} + p \cdot (\text{Gains} - \pi) - \bar{p} \cdot \pi_-$ , where  $\bar{p} = 1 - p$ .

- If we have an OR-node, then:

$$(\text{Costs}, p, \pi, \pi_-) = \begin{cases} (\text{Costs}_1, p_1, \pi_1, \pi_{1-}), & \text{if Outcome}_1 > \text{Outcome}_2 \\ (\text{Costs}_2, p_2, \pi_2, \pi_{2-}), & \text{if Outcome}_1 \leq \text{Outcome}_2 \end{cases}$$

where  $\text{Outcome}_i = -\text{Costs}_i + p_i \cdot (\text{Gains}_i - \pi_i) - \bar{p}_i \cdot \pi_{i-}$ ,  $i = 1, 2$ .

- If we have an AND-node, then:


$$\text{Costs} = \text{Costs}_1 + \text{Costs}_2, \quad p = p_1 \cdot p_2, \quad \pi = \pi_1 + \pi_2$$

$$\pi_- = \frac{p_1 \bar{p}_2 (\pi_1 + \pi_{2-}) + \bar{p}_1 p_2 (\pi_{1-} + \pi_2) + \bar{p}_1 \bar{p}_2 (\pi_{1-} + \pi_{2-})}{1 - p_1 p_2}$$

- Sjouke Mauw and Martijn Oostdijk reduction rules (DNF)

$$(t_1 \vee t_2) \wedge s \longmapsto (t_1 \wedge s) \vee (t_2 \wedge s)$$

- Example:



- Sometimes  $\text{Outcome}(T.x) \neq \text{Outcome}(T'.x)$

Let  $t_y \in \{t_1, t_2\}$  and

$$C_z = \text{Costs}_z + p_z \cdot \pi_z + (1 - p_z)\pi_{z-}$$

$$\Delta \text{Outcome}_{t_y}(x) = \text{Outcome}_x - \text{Outcome}_s =$$

$$= -C_{t_y} - C_s + p_{t_y} \cdot p_s \cdot \text{Gains} - (-C_s + p_s \cdot \text{Gains}) = -C_{t_y} - (1 - p_{t_y}) \cdot p_s \cdot \text{Gains}$$

$\Delta \text{Outcome}_{t_y}$  as a linear function of  $p_s$ , that could be noted as a pair  $(C_{t_y}, p_{t_y})$ .

Definitions:

$(C_{t_1}, p_{t_1})$  dominates  $(C_{t_2}, p_{t_2})$  if  $C_{t_1} \leq C_{t_2}$  and  $p_{t_1} \geq p_{t_2}$ .

$(C_{t_1}, p_{t_1})$  and  $(C_{t_2}, p_{t_2})$  multidominates  $(C_{t_3}, p_{t_3})$  if  $C_{t_1} < C_{t_3} < C_{t_2}$ ,  $p_{t_1} < p_{t_3} < p_{t_2}$  and the crossing-point of functions of  $t_1$  and  $t_2$  is always higher than the function of  $t_3$

The list method:

Every leaf  $t$  has a list of one element  $(C_t, p_t)$

OR-node list contains all its children's lists, where has been eliminated the pairs that are dominated or multidominated

In the AND-node we find every possibility to form the full attack and then find the parameters in the original way:

$$C = C_1 + C_2 + \dots + C_n$$

$$p = p_1 \cdot p_2 \cdot \dots \cdot p_n$$

If  $(C_{t_1}, p_{t_1})$  dominates  $(C_{t_2}, p_{t_2})$ , then in AND-node  $C_{t_1} + C_{t_3} \leq C_{t_2} + C_{t_3}$  and  $p_{t_1} \cdot p_{t_3} \geq p_{t_2} \cdot p_{t_3}$ , because  $p_{t_3} \geq 0$ . If  $(C_{t_1}, p_{t_1})$  and  $(C_{t_2}, p_{t_2})$  multidominates  $(C_{t_3}, p_{t_3})$ , then in AND-node  $C_{t_1} + C_{t_4} \leq C_{t_3} + C_{t_4} \leq C_{t_2} + C_{t_4}$  and  $p_{t_1} \cdot p_{t_4} \leq p_{t_3} \cdot p_{t_4} \leq p_{t_2} \cdot p_{t_4}$ , because  $p_{t_4} \geq 0$ .



## Example

Let  $t_1 = (\$0; 0, 9; \$0; \$120)$ ,  $t_2 = (\$0; 0, 1; \$0; \$1)$ ,  $t_3 = (\$0; 0, 5; \$0; \$10)$   
 $t_4 = (\$10; 0, 7; \$0; \$0)$  and  $s = (\$0; 0, 5; \$0; \$0)$ , Gains = \$20.


Then

$$\Delta \text{Out}_{t_1} = -12 - 2p_s$$

$$\Delta \text{Out}_{t_2} = -0.9 - 18p_s$$

$$\Delta \text{Out}_{t_3} = -5 - 10p_s$$

$$\Delta \text{Out}_{t_4} = -10 - 7p_s.$$



## Estimation method:

- We overestimate the attacker
- Less accurate
- error  $M$  and range  $[A, B] \in [0, 1]$
- AND-node's parameters  $C$  and  $p$  is calculated like before, only  $M = M_1 + M_2 + \dots + M_n$
- In OR-node we find  $(C_1, p_1, M_1)$  and  $(C_2, p_2, M_2)$ , where  $\Delta\text{Out}_1(A)$  and  $\Delta\text{Out}_2(B)$  are the highest on values  $A$  and  $B$  accordingly

- Generate new function  $\Delta\text{Out}_{est} = -C - (1 - p) \cdot \text{Gains} \cdot p_s$ , where  $C$  and  $p$  are calculated from  $\Delta\text{Out}_1(A)$  and  $\Delta\text{Out}_2(B)$

$$p = 1 - \frac{\Delta\text{Out}_2(B) - \Delta\text{Out}_2(A)}{(B - A) \cdot \text{Gains}}$$

$$C = \Delta\text{Out}_1(A) - (1 - p) \cdot \text{Gains}$$

- Calculate  $M = \max(M_1, M_2) + \Delta\text{Out}_{est}(P) - \Delta\text{Out}_1(P)$ ,  $P$  is the crossing-point of  $\Delta\text{Out}_1(A)$  and  $\Delta\text{Out}_2(B)$

$$P = \frac{C_2 - C_1}{\text{Gains} \cdot (p_2 - p_1)}$$

